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Recent Decisions
TORTS - RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR LI&BUIT OF CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS
Plaintiff brought an action for wrongful death against the Young
Women's Christian Association of Hamilton, Ohio.1 The petition
alleged that the decedent went to defendant's place of business, paid
the thirty-five cents admission fee, and proceeded to enter the swim-
ming pool, which was under the supervision of an employee of the
defendant. It further alleged that the decedent was pulled from the
pool in a state of suffocation and died minutes later. Six counts of
negligence which proximately caused the decedent's death were set
forth.
The trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer - for no
cause of action stated - on the ground that the defendant is a charit-
able institution and, therefore, is immune from respondeat superior
tort liability. The court of appeals reversed the judgment, follow-
ing the decision of Avellone v. St. John's Hospital.2 The supreme
court reversed the court of appeals and sustained the demurrer.
The question decided by the supreme court was whether a chari-
table institution that is not a hospital should be granted the immunity
from respondeat superior tort liability that has been given to eleemos-
ynary institutions in the past. Prior to 1922, charitable institutions
were entirely immune from such tort liability.3 Taylor v. Flower
Deaconess Home and Hospital,4 decided in 1922, limited this im-
munity by declaring that charitable institutions would be liable for
the negligent selection or retention of servants. In 1930, the supreme
court placed a further restriction upon this immunity by holding that
charitable institutions were liable to persons who were not beneficiar-
ies of the charity for torts committed by their servants.5 A benefi-
ciary of an eleemosynary institution would seem to be a person who
is receiving the benefits of the charity, even though he makes some
payment to the institution for its services. However, no definition
of a beneficiary has been pronounced by the Ohio courts.
Various theories have been propounded to justify the immunity.6
1. Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
2. 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
3. Taylor v. Protestant Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
4. 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922).
5. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52, 173 N.E. 737 (1930).
6. The trust fund theory declares that funds of a charity were given in trust to be used for
charitable purposes. Damages for torts of the servants is not a charitable purpose. The im-
plied waiver theory regards the patron of the charity as having impliedly waived his right to
damages for torts of the servants of the charity. Another theory regards only the servant
liable, since damages are to be paid out of the pocket of the wrongdoer. The rule of re-
spondeat superior is an exception to this general rule. Charitable institutions should not
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In 1956, however, the supreme court declared in the now renowned
.dvellone case,7 that regardless of previous justifications, certain char-
itable institutions could no longer receive the protection of immunity
against respondeat superior tort liability. The court held that public
policy now required that those charitable institutions which have
grown tremendously through the use of the corporate structure accept
their responsibility to the public, and recompense individuals whom
they have wronged.
Just how far this decision has destroyed the immunity under re-
spondeat superior has been an issue of great controversy. The .elvel-
lone decision, despite its great pronouncement of public policy, left
important questions unanswered. What criteria will be used to de-
termine whether or not an institution is one which is included within
the doctrine of the dvellone case? Does the rule remove the im-
munity as to all beneficiaries, or just as to paying patients, as in the
Avellone case? Since 1956 two lower court decisions involving hos-
pitals have followed the Avellone case and held defendant hospitals
liable for acts of their servants." Two other lower court decisions
have refused to apply the Avellone doctrine to cases involving
churches, on the ground that no changes have occurred in religious
organizations recently to justify a reversal in public policy toward
these organizations.9 However, in both of the latter cases the in-
juries were caused by falls in church parking lots, so that neither in-
volved the doctrine of respondeat superior. Gibbon v. YWGCA 10 is
the first case in which the supreme court has been able to amplify the
Avellone doctrine." It is also the first case in which a charitable in-
stitution other than a hospital has been implicated through the doc-
trine of respondeat superior.
Writing for the majority, Mr. Justice Herbert stated that the
demurrer to the petition can be sustained on the ground that the peti-
tion does not state facts constituting negligence. However, the
broader basis of the decision rested upon public policy, which Mr.
Justice Herbert's discussion justified on the ground that both lower
courts had decided the question on the policy issue of the immunity
doctrine. He felt that the Avellone case'12 removed the immunity
come within the exception. The public poliy theory simply states that institutions with such
beneficial aims should be encouraged; therefore, they should be exempt from the rule of
respondeat superior.
7. Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.2d 410 (1956).
8. Kletrovetz v. Grant Hosp., 105 Ohio App. 236, 152 N.E.2d 149 (1957); Andrews v.
Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 147 N.E.2d 645 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956), appeal dis-
missed, 166 Ohio St. 228 (1957).
9. Tamasello v. Hoban, 155 N.E.2d 82 (Ohio C.P. 1958); Hunsche v. Alter, 145 N.E2d
368 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
10. 170 Ohio St. 280, 164 N.E.2d 563 (1960).
11. Although the Avellone doctrine was mentioned in Wolf v. Ohio State Univ. Hosp., 170
Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475 (1959), the case was decided on another point. The Ohio State
University Hospital was held to be part of the sovereign, and thus not amenable to suit.
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only with respect to paying patients. Therefore, especially in the
light of recent legislative developments,13 he found no compelling rea-
son to extend or modify the A'vellone decision. Moreover, he rea-
soned that the decision in the instant case would avoid any retroactive
imposition of liability on charitable institutions, since no new or dif-
ferent public policy was set forth therein. But was the decedent in
the Gibbon case a paying patron? Mr. Justice Herbert never an-
swered this question. Is the YWCA different in its basic nature from
St. John's Hospital? The answer from the decision appears to be
yes, but no distinctions are mentioned. Thus, the Gibbon decision,
instead of clarifying the Avellone case, has only prolonged and in-
tensified the confusion in this important area of the law.
As previously indicated, the majority of the court admittedly did
not wish to declare further public policy in view of the legislature's
attempted action in its last session.14  It is interesting to note that
Governor DiSalle vetoed the bill because he felt that the need for
protection of the individual who is injured through the negligence of
a servant of a charitable institution is greater than the need of chari-
table institutions to be protected. This is precisely the reasoning used
in the Avellone case.
Three of the seven justices concurred in the judgment only, on the
ground that the petition did not state facts constituting negligence.
The concurring opinion written by Mr. Justice Bell 5 stated that the
rule of the A'vellone case must not be limited to hospitals alone. Mr.
Justice Taft, in a second concurring opinion,16 criticized the majority
opinion. He felt that the majority should have considered whether
the decedent made a payment to the defendant which would represent
a substantial equivalent to the benefits sought to be received from
the institution. From this the court could then have decided what
standard of care should be required of the institution. This question
is of vital importance because the issue was not raised in the 4vellone
case. There, the patient did pay a substantial amount to the institu-
tion. Mr. Justice Taft, questioning whether or not thirty-five cents
was a substantial amount for the benefits sought to be received, con-
curred with the majority opinion.
The Gibbon decision has serious limitations which could nullify
its future significance. Since the petition failed to state facts consti-
tuting negligence by the defendant, the portion of the majority opin-
12. Avellone v. St. John's Hosp., 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 NE.2d 410 (1956).
13. The Ohio Legislature came within a few votes of overriding Governor DiSalle's veto of
a bill to restore the immunity of all charitable institutions from respondeat superior tort lia-
bility for injuries to beneficiaries, except in cases involving gross negligence. S.B. 241, 103d
Ohio General Assembly (1959).
14. See discussion note 13, supra.
15. Gibbon v. YWCA, 170 Ohio St. 280, 295, 164 N.E.2d 563, 573 (1960) (concurring
opinion).
16. Id. at 294, 164 N.E.2d at 272 (concurring opinion).
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